COMMANDERS DIGEST

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

Secretary Laird
"This matter of threat is now being assessed . . ."

Secretary Laird Cites Soviet Missile Threat; Discusses ABM, Vietnamization, Spending

The United States will "undoubtedly" have to review its offensive strategic weapons systems if the Soviets continue deployment of the SS–9 missile at the present rate, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said at the Pentagon Jan. 7.

He indicated the Soviet Union could have a missile force of about 420 SS–9s in readiness earlier than the 1974 period he forecast to Congress last summer.

Secretary Laird did not say how many SS–9s are in place or under construction, nor how much earlier they would be ready.

". . . We will be prepared to go into that during the hearings before the Congressional committees. As you know, this whole situation of threat is under review now, under review as I prepare for my first appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is under review in connection with our ABM work, and the ABM program for next year and what we will be presenting to Congress in that area.

"This matter of the threat is now being assessed in connection with our posture statement, in connection with the presentation we will be making to Congress and in connection with our 1971 budget statement."

Asked what offensive weapons programs of the United States could be reviewed, Mr. Laird said:

"There are several possibilities that

(Continued on Page Two)

Chaplain Kelly: *'Our Serviceman's Courage and Valor On the Field Of Battle Is Matched By His Humanitarian Concern'*

The "humanitarian concern" of our serviceman in Vietnam, which matches his "courage and valor on the field of battle," are stories seldom reported by newsmen, Rear Admiral (chaplain) James W. Kelly, chief of chaplains, U.S. Navy, told members of the press Jan. 7 in Washington.

Chaplain Kelly, who recently returned from a visit to Southeast Asia, which included Christmas with servicemen in Vietnam, emphasized the tremendous humanitarian efforts being made—apart from the actual fighting.

"I am aware," he said, "that much of our public opinion has been polarized into the generally accepted 'hawk' and 'dove' positions. At the same time, there are many Americans, who, in deep concern, are raising questions which indicate their open-mindedness and their search for information which will help them reach or revise personal judgments about the critical issues regarding the war in Vietnam."

He noted that Americans are fed a "daily ration of news media coverage" of the more sensational aspects of combat and body count statistics. "But, do they really appreciate what our Marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen are involved in that motivated 10,000 sailors and 40,000 Marines to request extensions of six months or longer in Vietnam?" (Extensions by members of the other Services include: Air Force, 11,500; and Army, 92,500.)

Quoting a United Presbyterian minister, who had been to Vietnam three times, Chaplain Kelly commented, "The average American has little factual knowledge concerning the human needs of the people of this long-denied country, nor does he know what the majority of our servicemen know about what is being done to meet these needs. . . . The response of our young people to the crying needs of fellow human beings. It seems to me that there is a tremendous Peace Corps within the military establishment represented by thousands of young people deeply involved in a most significant effort to save lives, and to give hope and opportunity to thousands of eager but deprived people."

Stressing this was his fifth visit to Vietnam in as many

(Continued on Page Six)

Secretary Laird Cites Soviet Missile Threat; Discusses ABM, Vietnamization, Spending

(Continued from Page One)

would have to be looked at very carefully. One would certainly be speed up of a follow-on of the B-52. Another one could be the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS) program. I am not saying that we have made any decisions along this line . . . I am giving you those as two examples."

The Defense Secretary also commented in these areas:

ABM— . . . We are now drawing up, and will be prepared to present through the National Security Council procedure, the various options which are available under Phase II. This will be through the regular National Security Council review procedures . . . and we will have a full National Security Council meeting before a presidential decision.

VIETNAMIZATION—The President has directed me to go to Vietnam in the early part of February and I would rather make any prophecies or projections as far as any further actions in Vietnam based upon my on-the-spot review of the program. I am completely satisfied that the recommendations which have been made thus far—as far as our troop reductions are concerned . . . the security of our forces in Vietnam . . . the progress that has been pointed up by the President . . . the projections we have already made—can be met, and I am encouraged by the Vietnamization program.

DEFENSE SPENDING—We made substantial reductions this year. We have reduced our obligational authority by $8.5 billion this last year, and we are still going to reduce Defense expenditures in a very substantial way in 1971 . . .

We came down, we are continuing to come down, and we will be down in 1971.

As far as the total budget, in Fiscal Year 1968 Defense represented 43 per cent . . . in 1969 it was 42.3 per cent, and in Fiscal Year 1970, the first fiscal year in which I had responsibility for the full year, it will be down to 39.9 per cent. In Fiscal Year 1971 we will be going down again a substantial percentage level.

COST OVERRUNS—I think that one of the most significant accomplishments of my one-year term as Secretary of Defense (has been) putting on the record for the first time the cost overruns and cost growths of major weapons systems and major programs in the Department of Defense. As you know, when I testified in March, I told the Senate Armed Services Committee there was one thing I wanted to do. I wanted to put them all on the table now, because I did not want to inherit those cost growths and overruns. I identified them before the House Appropriations Committee—almost $20 billion—and I think it was important.

I do not want to say there are not going to be any cost overruns and cost growths while I am Secretary of Defense. There will always be cost growths in all of our military construction programs because we are not able to estimate in our estimates any increase in construction costs.

NAVY SABMIS—This is a program which we have funded in the 1969 budget as far as research and development. I want to make it clear that this is in the research and development area, and this is something that I supported in the funding for 1970. Also, as a member of the Committee, I supported it in 1969 . . . and I believe that this is a program that we certainly should continue to look at in the research and development area.

PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT—I think we have been able to get a feeling for participatory management established here in the Department of Defense. That has been important, because when you are going down and cutting back on your military establishment and your defense spending, it is most important that you have not only your civilian leadership, but your military leadership, participating in the decision-making process. I will make the decisions, but I want them to participate . . . and I want them to feel they are participating in it . . . I think this is important.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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GENERAL COUNSEL—While his wife looks on, Jack Stempler (right) is sworn in by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as General Counsel of the Air Force. Stempler previously was Secretary Laird's assistant for legislative affairs.

Expresses Views on All-Volunteer Force, DoD Progress, Protesters

The All-Volunteer Force concept is not the "panacea for which we are seeking," Robert F. Froehlke, assistant secretary of defense for administration, stated Jan. 9.

In remarks before the Wisconsin Press Association, Mr. Froehlke said, "the concept has much to commend it," but expressed these concerns:

—I think every young American should serve his country in some capacity. When the draft ends, a broad range of service to the country by many youths may end also. The Peace Corps will suffer, VISTA will suffer. And that many more Americans become that much more self-centered.

—The concept has great emotional appeal. But we may all be shocked at the price tag. Will we be willing to put up or shut up?

—Thirdly, will a volunteer force be adequate for large-scale emergencies?

—Is a strictly mercenary army really what America is all about?

He noted that the President has appointed a commission to study the volunteer force concept, and "all these questions are being thoroughly explored, and their answers carefully considered."

Following are additional excerpts from Mr. Froehlke's remarks:

Considering the temper of the times, I think the Laird-Packard team's outstanding accomplishment is that it inherited a department that was the target of violent attacks, and they provided leadership that improved the morale and effectiveness of the department, and, in one short year, have made some significant improvements.

One of the most significant accomplishments was to develop a program of Vietnamization which appeals to the U.S. public as a means of honorable extrication from Vietnam.

There may yet be serious setbacks to the South Vietnamese. But Vietnamization is making them even stronger—to withstand any difficulty and survive. I am confident our citizens will have the stamina to accept any temporary reverses as we move toward peace.

A new draft law has been enacted. We in Defense think it is an improvement. I believe most young men agree. It reduces their vulnerability to draft calls from seven years to one year. It reduces uncertainty and it gives them a better chance to plan their lives, always a plus factor.

Assistant Secretary Froehlke

. . .The Defense budget has been sharply reduced.

In Fiscal Year 1968, the Defense budget was 43 per cent of the total Federal budget. In FY 1969 it was 42.3 per cent. This year, FY 1970, it is 39.9 per cent and next year, FY 1971, it will be even less than that.

(Secretary Laird) has worked hard at keeping the Congress informed. He has spent a great deal of time testifying on Capitol Hill. As a result, confidence and credibility have been restored and critical votes have been won.

Steps have been taken to improve morale and efficiency within the department. Both (Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard) have decentralized decision-making. They are trying to get decisions down to where the action is. In doing this they are trying to maintain time and perspective for themselves so that they can establish departmental policy.

Part of decentralization involves having key figures in the department participate in the management process. Participatory management, in itself, I think has contributed to decentralized decisions, better decisions, and better attitudes in the department.

Defense has spotlighted the prisoner of war problem in Southeast Asia. We intend to keep the plight of these men in the public's eye, with the expectation that doing so we are helping them and their families.

At this point, if I were listening to my own recital, it sounds like everything is coming up roses. That is unrealistic. We will face some tough problems in the year ahead and the answers won't come easy. I would guess some of the problems for 1970 might be:

—1970 will be a political year. I think we can expect that the anti-military pressures will increase, and many candidates, sensing this mood, will hop on the anti-DoD bandwagon.

—Pressure to reduce the Defense budget will continue and probably even increase. Secretary Laird, based on his years in Congress, is aware of this pressure and he understands it. He appreciates that other national priorities are pressing, and must be satisfied. But he also recognizes his responsibility for national defense and that there is a limit below which we should not go.

—In the climate of the budget squeeze we must avoid the temptation to reduce research and development funds. R&D is a tempting target—$8 billion. Such reductions would appeal to many critics, particularly in the intellectual community. Perhaps the most tempting aspect of such cuts is that they would have little or no immediate affect. The damage would become visible in critical years later . . .

—Cost growth will still be with us. Congress, for example, requires budget estimates for construction to be based upon current costs. We are not permitted to project future costs upward. The Laird-Packard team has placed great management emphasis on cost controls.

—1970 will, of course, experience its share of protests.

Let me suggest a test for determining the credibility of the protest.

Is protesting selling a point of view or is it attempting to stifle another's? What selling techniques do they use? Are they honest or high pressure?

Perhaps most revealing, have the protesters spent any time working in any civic organization, to improve the local community?

Frankly, I have little time to give the individual who deplores and offers suggestions for the state of the world and doesn't have time to put his arm around his neighbor next door.

Statement by Secretary Rogers

U.S. POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The most comprehensive statement of U.S. policy on the Middle East issued by this Administration was recently delivered by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

No area of the world today is more important because it "could easily again become the source of another serious conflagration," Mr. Rogers said. Since it was obvious that Israel and the Arab countries alone "could not overcome their legacy of suspicion to achieve a political settlement," he pointed out, the U.S. decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in international efforts to help in seeking a solution. Participating in Four Power talks at the U.N. and in bilateral talks with the USSR, the U.S. has recently submitted detailed proposals on specific aspects of the Middle East problem.

"A durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides," Secretary Rogers emphasized in his policy speech of Dec. 9, pointing out that "necessary compromises" advocated by the U.S. "may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides." Following are excerpts from his statement.

When this Administration took office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully the entire situation in the Middle East.

We accepted a suggestion put forward both by the French Government and the secretary general of the United Nations. We agreed that the major powers—the U.S., the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France—should cooperate to assist the secretary general's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working out a settlement in accordance with the resolution of the U.N. Security Council of November 1967. We also decided to consult directly with the Soviet Union, hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.

We knew that nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the people and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. [But] the efforts of major powers can help.

Our policy is and will continue to be a *balanced* one. We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution.

The Security Council Resolution

Let me outline our policy on various elements of the Security Council Resolution. The basic and related issues might be described as peace, security, withdrawal and territory.

• *Peace between the Parties:* The Resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years. We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and the Straights of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

• *Security.* A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the Security Council Resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security arrangements.

'A durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.'

• *Withdrawal and Territory.* The Security Council Resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the Resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 Armistice Agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the Armistice Agreements.

The Security Council Resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied terri-

tories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the Resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.

Refugees and Jerusalem

By emphasizing the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal and territory, I do not want to leave the impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular deserve special mention—the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the U.S. for over 20 years. During this period the U.S. has contributed about $500 million for the support and education of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.

The question of the future status of Jerusalem, because it touches deep emotional, historical and religious well-springs, is particularly complicated. We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and one-half years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which we believe would provide an equitable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.

Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city.

I have already referred to our talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab states by urging the UAR to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement between Israel and the UAR. We have been doing this in the full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on other aspects of the settlement—not only those related to the UAR but also those related to Jordan and other states which accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1967.

We started with the Israeli-UAR aspect because of its inherent importance for future stability in the area and because one must start somewhere.

We are also ready to pursue the Jordanian aspects of a settlement—in fact the Four Powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let me make it perfectly clear that the U.S. position is that implementation of the overall settlement would

'We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides.'

begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects of the problem.

In our recent meetings with the Soviets, we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions. They consist of three principal elements:

First, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the UAR to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

Second, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the Armistice Agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the Four Power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm al-Shaykh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution, and final arrangements in the Gaza Strip.

Third, in the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the UAR. It would require the UAR to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.

We believe that this approach is *balanced* and fair. We remain interested in good relations with all states in the area. . . . We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We remain prepared to work with others—in the area and throughout the world—so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.

Chaplain Kelly: 'Our Serviceman's Courage and Valor On the Field Of Battle Is Matched By His Humanitarian Concern'

(Continued from Page 1)

years, the chaplain said he had visited front line bunkers, hospitals, trenchlines, villages and hamlets, and had "acquired some very strong and, I feel, well founded conclusions".

"One thing is unchanged," he said, "and that is the consistent and unwavering dedication, loyalty and courage of the American fighting man".

"First, I was encouraged and found inspiration in the gentle people—the South Vietnamese—many of whom once fled from North Vietnam and who since have fled the terror of the Viet Cong and NVA, but many of whom now cease to be refugees. Resettlement is encouraging. They are returning to their hamlets and villages, rebuilding their homes, replanting their farms and rice paddies. In spite of occasional acts of terror by the enemy—acts of terror which are used for the purpose of coercion—the Vietnamese are turning to a strengthened government. And, let there be no mistake about it: the government of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger. In talking with Vietnamese during my visits and through information which comes from chaplains in the field, it is obvious that the vast majority of the people know what Communism is and they don't like it.

"The argument for an improvement in the Vietnamese government and the lot of the people can be proved not merely by citing numbers. You go to village after village and hamlet after hamlet where our Combined Action Platoons are located for the security and support of the people. You see wells being dug, latrines being built, buildings, classrooms and churches under construction. You see the people well-fed and prospering. You see their crops in the glory of growth. You watch the people, especially the old people, smile. The refugees are going home because security permits it."

He emphasized that 469,336 refugees returned through December 1, 1969 compared with only 90,000 who returned home in 1968.

Chaplain Kelly noted that the South Vietnamese Army is stronger. "Not only does its number exceed 1,000,000, its capacity for standing against aggression from the north is being proven daily. The South Vietnamese have moved through the stage of dependence to interdependence. It is our prayer that they may soon be capable of reaching the stage of independence," he said.

"Our humanitarian outreach is one of the glories of our involvement," the chief of Navy chaplains pointed out. "Our servicemen's courage and valor on the field of battle is matched by his humanitarian concern. There are a multitude of stories in Vietnam—stories that do not get told, stories that would help reveal in the clear light of day information so vital to an objective appraisal of the efforts and sacrifices of American servicemen. If known, they would instill in the American people a sense of pride, respect and admiration," he stressed.

The following are excerpts of specific references to problems related to Vietnam covered by Chaplain Kelly who visited Southeast Asia after the October and November 1969 Moratoriums:

As I went to Vietnam on this last Christmas, I went with a heavy heart and the fear and apprehension that events on the homefront would have dissipated some of the serviceman's enthusiasm and high morale. Certainly he is not deaf, dumb and blind. He knows that the cause for which he makes his sacrifices does not have the unqualified support and admiration of a portion of the American community.



The hood of a jeep serves as a makeshift altar as Commander Martin J. Doermann, 12th Marine Regimental chaplain, conducts services at Gio Linh, south of the Demilitarized Zone.

The *Stars and Stripes* and *American Forces Radio and TV* give him reports on the Moratorium efforts, the anti-military dialogue, the daily exhortations for American youth to evade their military obligations, and the mounting evidence that the virtues of patriotism, duty, service of country, honor among fellowmen, and courage in the face of danger are suspect. He knows that some call him the tool of the aggressive, oppressive and expansionist interests of self-seeking opportunists.

To his glory is that the detractors have not succeeded in dissipating his morale, diminishing his dedication, or shaking his resolve to serve hs country and the long suffering people of South Vietnam.

He is, I observed, hurt by but yet generally indifferent to the report of or failure to report his achievements. He knows what he is doing, why he is doing it, and does not have time to worry about the detractors. He is not given to heroic lines or on-stage posturing. He is less concerned about public opinion

than the job at hand. He has less time for scoffers, who have no time for heroes, than they have for him.

Being normal, he is disappointed. As one Marine said, I'm not expecting much when I get back. We know there will be no parades on Fifth Avenue. We're aware of the political situation back home. But neither do we expect to get attacked for what we've done, and which we're proud of. We've served our country."

The serviceman doesn't like being referred to as a tool of imperialist aggression, especially when the words are delivered in an American accent, but he has little time to pay attention to it. He is too busy searching for mines, set by the Vietcong or North Vietnamese—mines planted by the people whose flag some Americans choose to fly—mines that have killed and injured more Vietnamese civilians than they have American troops.

'He knows that it is easy for gentle people, who have never seen tyranny, war, or terror, to call themselves doves. And, he knows that because he fights tyranny and terror, some call him a hawk.'

He observes a nation—his free nation—tiring of war and its expense, questioning all forms of preparedness and defense as if this earth—this spinning island in the sky—were populated by a placid, cooperative, compassionate, peace loving, quiescent fellowship of man.

Yet, he knows that no one wants peace *more* than he does—or other sailors, soldiers, Marines, Seabees or airmen when they are in battle. No one wants peace more than the rifleman on his 60th patrol—or the artilleryman returning counterfire during a rocket and mortar attack on his position—or the aviator flying his third MEDIVAC mission in one day. He always longs for peace. He looks forward to the day when he can go home, having acquitted himself with honor. But, he doesn't want to settle for anything less than a free and prosperous South Vietnam. He needs peace more than most Americans need it.

On a recent visit to Vietnam, General Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Corps, asked a badly wounded and hospitalized Marine on whom he was pinning a Purple Heart, how he felt about the hometown anti-war demonstrators whose actions were depicted in pictures and a news article in a paper that lay on his bed. "Oh," he said, "it doesn't bother me because they don't know what they're doing." General Walt replied, "How can you be sure? Here, you almost lost your life at the DMZ and your buddies at home are demonstrating against what you are doing. What do you mean when you say it doesn't bother you? How can you be so sure that you're right, and they're wrong?" "Well," he said, "I just know they don't know what they're doing, General, because last year, before I came into the Marine Corps, I was one of them."

I want to make brief reference to racial problems which I prefer to call problems in human relations. This is an area of my deep concern. One cannot transport a cross section or microcosm of our population to another environment or into an alien culture and expect all of the social problems to mysteriously disappear. Yet, where men are in supportive concerns which involve life and death issues and where dependence upon others is of vital importance, you expect, and, from opinions I have heard voiced by servicemen and their leaders, have a definite lessening of critical incidents. The problem of human relations is not a new problem and not a military problem, but rather an issue of national concern.

During his fifth Christmas tour to the Republic of Vietnam, Rear Admiral James W. Kelly, chief of chaplains, and some of the chaplains of the First Marine Division, gather in front of the division chapel during a meeting of chaplains.

An issue of greater concern for the American serviceman is his need to defend the Vietnamese people. This defense is matched by his humanitarian efforts which I have illustrated:

He is a youth—an American youth who is part of the new generation. But he holds on to many of the old values, old virtues and old morals. And, he can distinguish between the flag of his country and that of his enemy. He is deserving of our great praise and gratitude. He is an American whose involvement in war has not only not robbed him of his humanity, it has enhanced it. He has refused to be dehumanized by the war. Except in the heat of conflict, he has a heart of exceeding compassion and concern. The war he is involved in, as all wars, is ugly, but the military man is a specimen of considerable beauty. He continues to be a goodwill ambassador of his country.

And, he continues to be a man who needs and relates to his religious heritage. The intensity of his needs may vary in relation to the level of danger. As one said, "I didn't go regularly to church at home but I feel more religious now. Maybe it relates to my fear, but it also relates to my need. One needs something to hold on to and I can't think of anything or anyone better than God. Now that I've found him, I guess I will always see the need for Him."

Mr. Fitzhugh Explains Organizational Study to Streamline DoD



Gilbert W. Fitzhugh

*Panel—

*Objective—

*Approach—

*Results—

(In June 1969 President Nixon established a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel to study the organization of the Department of Defense, its research and development programs and its procurement practices. When he announced that Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, chairman of the board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, would head the panel, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said the study would be the most comprehensive review of the Defense Department since the Hoover Commission studies of 1947 and 1953. The panel has one year to complete the study. Following are Mr. Fitzhugh's views on the panel's organization and objectives.)

* * *

Q.—Some of your panel members have contact with the Department of Defense through their normal occupations. Will this affect the credibility of your study?

A.—I guess the best way to answer that is to explain why the panel was picked. It was intended to be an outside panel, primarily, so that it could have an objective look at the Department of Defense.

As it is an organizational study, they started with people who had experience in managing large organizations in the private area. So, it started with a nucleus of people in business not aligned with people in the Department of Defense. Then, as this was considered, it was felt they would really be babes in the wilderness if there were not some people on the panel who had some experience in the Department of Defense. We wanted perhaps three members on the panel who were sufficiently knowledgeable about the Department of Defense so we wouldn't overlook anything. There are 16 members on the panel, and three are defense-oriented.

Q.—Are any of the members reservists or retired military?

A.—We have one retired admiral—Admiral Wilfred J. McNeil—who not only had his Navy experience as an admiral but was comptroller of the Department of Defense.

Q.—What is your over all objective?

A.—Our objective is to see what an outside group can contribute to making the Department of Defense a harder hitting, more streamlined, and more effective organization. We have no preconceived ideas as to what the results are going to be, but experience shows that organizations are always in a process of evolution, and another look can always find a better way of doing something.

Q.—How does your study differ from an in-house study?

A.—I think there are two major differences. In the first place, most in-house studies are for a particular purpose, and they are specific problem oriented. Secondly, they are made by people who have been in the job for a number of years, and they approach it from their own background. We have not been given a problem to solve. We have been asked to look at how the Department of Defense solves its problems.

Q.—How have you approached the study?

A.—We divided ourselves into five task forces. The first one has to do with the basic structure of the organization, the decision making process, the manpower problems of DoD. The second is looking into research and development, weapons procurement, weapons in general, supply and transportation. The third group covers all those things directly concerned with command and control, including communications and intelligence. The fourth includes the broad area of housing, medical services, equal opportunity, hospitals and the interfaces with other government agencies and other parts of the public. The fifth one is the coordinating group.

Q.—Does your study include trips to the field units?

A.—Yes. We felt from the beginning that if we are really going to understand the operations of the Department of Defense, we have to study it at headquarters and we also have to see how it looks from the other end. We could sit here in Washington and consider all the directives that are sent out and all the organizational decisions being made, but unless we go out and see how they are implemented, we would not know whether or not it was a worthwhile study.

In November a group of the panel members toured defense installations in Europe, and in January we will visit installations in the Far East. We are going to listen to everyone who is willing to talk. Obviously, as a practical matter, with more than four million people in the Department of Defense, we have to spend most of our time with people at the management level. But, we do want to talk to people at all levels, right down to the man who carries a rifle or pounds a typewriter.

Q.—Will you make any suggestions before the end of your study?

A.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird specifically told us if we came up with something not to wait for the end of the study to produce it. So far, I must say, everything is so interrelated that I would, as of now anyway, hesitate to make a recommendation on item A until we know what we are going to say on item B, because we might come up with something on item B that would make us wish we might have said item A a bit differently.

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